This essay offers a theoretical analysis of the changes which are taking place in the musical consciousness of listeners in the present phase of society. The author seeks rather to deduce the conditions of musical reception from the present stage of musical production. The first part of the article deals with changes in production as they affect the general consciousness of listeners. Light music is discussed as well as serious music insofar as it reaches the consumer. Changes in reception are (...) revealed in certain characteristics like the cult of the melody, of the voice, of the master violin, and they are tied up with specific economic concepts. Success plays a particularly important role in this connection.The second part is devoted to the retrogression in listening, analyzed psychologically. Docile passivity, imitation of pre-given patterns, and bitter resentment of the „abnormal“ have become characteristic for the listener. The author shows how this retrogression has become concretized in the formation of a „musical child’s language.“Many listeners seek to overcome passivity by a pseudo-activity. The social function of certain types like the jitter-bug, the radio amateur, or the man with a knack for jazz, are discussed.L’article entreprend d’interpréter sous forme d’une esquisse théorique les transformations qu’a subies la conscience musicale des auditeurs dans la phase actuelle de l’évolution sociale.On n’analyse pas psychologiquement les réactions des auditeurs ; mais on prend pour point de départ Tétât de la production, et de celui-ci on déduit celui de la réception.La première partie traite de la transformation de la production dans la mesure où celle-ci atteint la conscience commune des auditeurs. L’auteur considère aussi bien la musique légère que la soi-disant musique sérieuse et les modifications que connaît celle-ci pour parvenir à la consommation.Ces modifications font de la musique un fétiche. On en prend pour exemple le culte des „idées“ musicales, de la voix et des „violons de maître“. Le caractère fétiche de la musique se mesure au succès accumulé.Ensuite, on développe quelques catégories du fétichisme musical : dépravation, arrangement, „divertissement élevé“, idolâtrie de la perfection.Au fétichisme de la musique correspond du côté de l’auditeur une régression de la faculté d’entendre — phénomène qui fait l’objet de la deuxième partie de l’étude. On l’interprète comme l’attitude auditive caractéristique des „régressifs“. Soumission passive, imitation de l’antérieurement donné, fureur contre ce qui sort de la norme — définissent cette attitude, qui s’objective en un langage musical puéril en formation et dont quelques éléments sont esquissés.A cette passivité, de larges groupes d’auditeurs cherchent vainement à échapper par une pseudo-activité. Quelques types de pseudo-activité sont décrits : l’enthousiaste, le bricoleur et le „chic type“. On montre la fonction sociale de ces types.Enfin, on traite des possibilités dialectiques de l’audition du régressif. Une confrontation de l’expérience fondamentale de la musique radicalement neuve avec le mode régressif d’entendre termine l’article. (shrink)

This book is divided into two general parts: an exposition of Trendelenburg's thought which is admirably written; and an attempt to provide "demonstrative evidence" of Dewey's "dependence" upon Trendelenburg's influence. In fact the evidence is not decisive, but consists rather in citation of many parallels in the themes and doctrines of the two thinkers, and in George Sylvester Morris, who was Trendelenburg's student for three semesters and Dewey's teacher for one, and whose work does show the direct influence of Trendelenburg. (...) The difficulty with Rosenstock's thesis is, first, that many of Dewey's ideas cited in support of it also echo those of other, principally Germanic, predecessors; and, second, that it is just as plausible, given the lack of any explicit tie-up of Dewey and Trendelenburg, that their ideas developed independently in response to similar philosophical milieu. And indeed the author shows how much alike their philosophical adversaries were. But in spite of the possible inconclusiveness of his book, Rosenstock has shown that Trendelenburg was a forerunner of John Dewey and an undeservedly neglected thinker. Rosenstock might well put us in his debt now by giving us a full and critical treatment of Trendelenburg's work.—C. T. W. (shrink)

Following the lead of Hans Reichenbach in the early twentieth century, many authors have attributed a causal theory of time to Leibniz. My exposition of Leibniz’s theory of time in a paper of 1985 has been interpreted as a version of such a causal theory, even though I was critical of the idea that Leibniz would have tried to reduce relations among monadic states to causal relations holding only among phenomena. Since that time previously unpublished texts by Leibniz have become (...) available in which he himself explains temporal precedence in terms of causal precedence, and these texts have been given careful scrutiny by other scholars, such as Jan Cover, Stefano Di Bella and Michael Futch. In this paper I respond to their analyses, and try to make precise the way in which Leibniz’s views on time and on causality fit together in his metaphysics. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;I deal with two themes: the idea that an account of thought should be given by giving an account of the ascription of thoughts by a radical interpreter--which I call interpretationism; and the idea that psychological concepts like action and perception are essentially causal. It has often been thought that these two themes conflict; or at least, that if they can co-exist, then they must be kept separate, and (...) associated with different perspectives on behaviour. But is that right? I discuss the character of interpretationism and the nature of causal theories, and examine the extent to which the two themes are compatible. ;Chapter I explains and argues for an interpretationist approach, distinguishing between different interpretationist views, and defending interpretationism against various common objections. ;Chapter II examines the links between interpretationism and the anomalousness of the mental. I discuss a number of different arguments and distinguish a range of theses about anomalousness and indeterminacy which they may support. ;Chapter III discusses the motivation for causal theories. I explain why it matters that we should give causal theories within an interpretationist perspective rather than treating the two themes as insights of different perspectives; and I examine the difficulties of doing so. ;Chapter IV considers the causal theory of vision. I argue against the view that the interpretationist's conception of experience undermines the causal theory. ;Chapter V considers the case of action. I develop a substantive causal theory of action which responds to the following argument: that if we accept the interpretationist's claim that the mental is anomalous, then we must concede that mental properties cannot be causally relevant. ;From the particular cases, and on general grounds, I conclude that it is possible to adopt an interpretationist perspective which simultaneously sees the mental in causal terms; and that such a perspective is essential for an adequate understanding of the mind. (shrink)

Although the notion of spatiality has always lurked in the background of discussions of literary form, the self-conscious use of the term as a critical concept is generally traced to Joseph Frank's seminal essay of 1945, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature."1 Frank's basic argument is that modernist literary works are "spatial" insofar as they replace history and narrative sequence with a sense of mythic simultaneity and disrupt the normal continuities of English prose with disjunctive syntactic arrangements. This argument has been (...) attacked on several fronts. An almost universal objection is that spatial form is a "mere metaphor" which has been given misplaced concreteness and that it denies the essentially temporal nature of literature. Some critics will concede that the metaphor contains a half-truth, but one which is likely to distract attention from more important features of the reading experience. The most polemical attacks have come from those who regard spatial form as an actual, but highly regrettable, characteristic of modern literature and who have linked it with antihistorical and even fascist ideologies.2 Advocates of Frank's position, on the other hand, have generally been content to extrapolate his premises rather than criticize them, and have compiled an ever-mounting list of modernist texts which can be seen, in some sense, as "antitemporal." The whole debate can best be advanced, in my view, not by some patchwork compromise among the conflicting claims but by a radical, even outrageous statement of the basic hypothesis in its most general form. I propose, therefore, that far from being a unique phenomenon of some modern literature, and far from being restricted to the features which Frank identifies in those works , spatial form is a crucial aspect of the experience and interpretation of literature in all ages and cultures. The burden of proof, in other words, is not on Frank to show that some works have spatial form but on his critics to provide an example of any work that does not. · 1. Frank's essay first appeared in Sewanee Review 53 and was revised in his The Widening Gyre . Frank's basic argument has not changed essentially even in his most avante-garde statements; he still regards spatial form "as a particular phenomenon of modern avante-garde writing." See "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics," Critical Inquiry 4 : 231-52. A useful bibliography, "Space and Spatial Form in Narrative," is being complied by Jeffrey Smitten .· 2. This charge generally links the notion of spatial form with Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, the imagist movement, the "irrationality" and pessimistic antihistoricism of modernism, and the conservative Romantic tradition. Frank discusses the complex motives behind these associations in the work of Robert Weimann and Frank Kermode in his "Answer to Critics," pp. 238-48. W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is the author of Blake's Composite Art, and The Last Dinosaur Book: The Life and Times of a Cultural Icon. The present essay is part of Iconology: The Image in Literature and the Visual Arts. "Diagrammatology" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. Leon Surette responds to the current essay in "‘Rational Form in Literature’". (shrink)

In this 1964 Saint Augustine Lecture, Callahan shows how Augustine refashioned three major doctrines which he inherited from his Greek and Christian predecessors. By far the most interesting doctrine that Callahan presents deals with the evolution of the concept of perfection. The author traces the development of the concept from its most anthropomorphic appearance in Homer and the pre-Socratics to its most famous expression in the ontological argument of Anselm. He shows how Anselm had derived his own argument for God's (...) perfection from an argument which Augustine used in the seventh book of the Confessions to establish God's incorruptibility. Callahan also examines Augustine's presentation of the ancient theme of the "flight of the soul" from the evils of this earth to the sanctuary of holiness or wisdom. In this portion of his lecture and in the final portion that deals with Augustine's psychological approach to the problem of time, Callahan is not at his best. His speculation on the extent of Augustine's indebtedness to Gregory of Nyssa provides the reader with little insight into Augustine's own viewpoint. This tendency toward distraction flaws the book because it fails to point out how Augustine infused inherited philosophical abstractions with the baroque vitality of his own genius.--W. D. T. (shrink)

The article consists of four chapters taken from a comprehensive study on Wagner.The first chapter discusses the character of the man Wagner. The author undertakes a social analysis which reveals Wagner to be a bourgeois figure who is no longer able to fulfill the monadological claims of bourgeois society, and who actually deserts to the ruling powers while seemingly in conflict with the society of his day. This analysis is made particularly clear through a study of Wagner's anti-Semitism.The following sections, (...) only excerpts of which appear in the present essay, study the relationship between Wagner’s social character and the technical structure of his works, using concepts such as the conductor- composer and the,,gestural type“ of composition. This approach involves minute analyses of certain essential elements of Wagner's technique : the leitmotif, the infinite („unendliche“) melody, his harmonization and scoring.From the principle of Wagner's instrumentation the author derives the concept of phantasmagoria, which is the subject of the sixth chapter of the larger wrork (reprinted here). Phantasmagoria is defined as the aesthetic phenomenon that tends to hide the mode of its genesis and to appear as „nature“.The seventh and eighth chapters have not been included. They deal with the notion of the music drama as the phantasmagoric form, developed primarily from Wagner's theoretical writings, and with the mythical element in his work. The mythical in Wagner is two-sided, for it seeks to interpret the unconscious and in turn to dissolve the real into the unconscious.The two final chapters are devoted to the philosophy inherent in the works of Wagner and to a philosophical interpretation of his work. Chapter nine discusses the Ring from the standpoint of the betrayal of the revolution by the „rebel“. The canon is given by analysis of Wotan as the unity of Impotent old god and beggar. Chapter ten describes Wagner's pessimism. It shows the fundamental difference between Wagner and Schopenhauer, analyzes the Wagnerian concept of the nil as that of the chimaerical, and concludes by „rescuing“ his nihilism as the form adopted by Utopia in the early period of bourgeois decay.L'article se compose de quatre chapitres extraits d’un vaste travail consacré à Richard Wagner.Le premier chapitre étudie la personnalité de Wagner : son caractère est défini comme étant celui du bourgeois désormais incapable de répondre aux exigences monadologiques de la société bourgeoise. L’apparence d’un conflit avec la société masque la soumission de fait aux puissances établies : c’est ce qui est étudié de près dans l’analyse de l’antisémitisme wagnérien.Les chapitres suivants, desquels la présente publication n’offre que des extraits, établissent d’abord — grâce aux concepts du chef d’orchestre et du mode „gestique“ de la composition — le rapport entre le caractère social de Wagner et la complexité technique de son oeuvre. Viennent ensuite des analyses détaillées de quelques éléments essentiels du mode wagnérien de composition, tels que la technique du leitmotiv, de la mélodie infinie, de l’harmonique et de l’instrumentation.Le concept de la fantasmagorie est déduit du principe de l’instrumentation wagnérienne : voilà le thème central du sixième chapitre que notre texte présente, de nouveau, intégralement. La fantasmagorie est définie comme le phénomène esthétique qui renie le mode de sa production.Les chapitres VII et VIII encore, manquent dans la présente publication. Ils traitent du concept du drame musical en tant que forme fantasmagorique. Ce sont surtout les écrits théoriques de Wagner qui servent à développer ce concept. On en vient à examiner l’élément mythique de l’oeuvre wagnérienne — élément équivoque en ce qu’il tend à interpréter l’inconscient en même temps qu’il voudrait le dissoudre dans un inconscient plus profond encore.Les deux derniers chapitres étudient la philosophie inhérente de Wagner, et tâchent de donner une interprétation philosophique de son oeuvre. Le neuvième chapitre donne une analyse du „Ring“ — la trahison de la révolution par le „rebelle“. Le „canon“ du raisonnement est, ici, la figure de Wotan — à la fois vieux dieu rendu impuissant et mendiant. Le chapitre X décrit le pessimisme wagnérien. Il expose la différence fondamentale entre Wagner et Schopenhauer, la reconstruction méthodique du concept wagnérien du néant montre que ce néant est chimérique. La conclusion est, en quelque sorte, une réhabilitation du nihilisme wagnérien en ce que ce nihilisme fut la forme que revêtit l’utopie au début de la décadence bourgeoise. (shrink)

This book comes strongly to the defence of educational theory and shows that it has a structure and integrity of its own. The author argues that the validity of educational theory may best be judged in terms of the various assumptions made in it. His argument is illustrated by a review and critique of some particularly influential theories of education: those of Plato, Rousseau, James Mill and John Dewey. He stresses the need for an on-going, contemporary, general theory of (...) education and examines the ways in which the disciplines of psychology, sociology and philosophy can contribute to a general theory of this kind. (shrink)

A selection of the writings of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of logic and mathematics written in the years 1937-1944. There is no concern with the foundations of mathematics in the sense of metamathematics nor in the sense of investigation of the possibility of providing secure axiomatic foundations for such notions as that of "set." Indeed, the original motives for these latter investigations are rejected; instead, a clarification of the grammar of mathematical propositions is sought. The author discusses the notions of (...) mathematical proof at length and attacks both the Russellian view that mathematics is an appendage of logic and Hilbert's program of proof-theory.--W. T. (shrink)

On the one hand, it is obvious that a person’s conscious experiences are unified with one another in a way that they are not unified with anyone else’s experiences. My experiences are mine, and yours are not. On the other hand, it is equally plain that a person’s experiences are not monolithic. Generally, I can distinguish various aspects of my experiences, and I can attend to some rather than others. Conscious experience is unified, and it is not. Is there a (...) unification thesis that is substantial, interesting and plausible? Tim Bayne sets out to defend an affirmative answer in his The Unity of Consciousness. (shrink)

In this lecture Armstrong argues that the main point of difference between Saint Augustine and other Christian Platonists centers less on how they view the effectiveness of man's free will than on their view of man's relationship to God. The Platonic tradition always stressed the goodness of the deity. Augustine, however, stressed God's immutability and power, and paid little attention to His goodness and His offer of redemption to all men, including those who stand outside the institutionalized church. This engaging (...) 1966 Saint Augustine Lecture is an unabashed polemic which is cast within an examination of three topics which illustrate Augustine's relationship to pagan and Christian Platonism. The criticism is stated with refreshing boldness and masterly erudition. The extensive notes are stimulating and informative. In the first section the author discusses the natural divinity of the soul and tells why most Christian thinkers, including Augustine, rejected the Platonic view that man's soul is naturally divine. The second topic presents the different attitudes Augustine and Platonism expressed toward the body and the material universe. Here Armstrong argues that in their fervent rejection of the Plotinian doctrine of the mystical body of the universe, Christians lost the sense of the holiness of everyday life and thereby dampened their awareness of the immediacy of the Holy Spirit. In his last topic of discussion Armstrong preaches against Augustine's doctrine of selective predestination and his conception of God as an arbitrary tyrant. These two views, says Armstrong, bring bad news to mankind and cause extreme pessimism rather than an awakening of love--the motive force which speeds man back to God.--W. D. T. (shrink)

An aspect of Pisistratus, which has not hitherto been utilized in this question , appears to justify another presentment of the evidence which connects him with the Homeric tradition. I shall endeavour to be brief and not to repeat what is common property or irrelevant. The literature and the bearing of the controversy are given with his usual clearness by P. Cauer, Grundfragen der Homerkritik,2 pp. 125 sqq. Cauer's private doctrine, that Homer was for the first time written down by (...) Pisistratus, I consider sufficiently refuted by C. Rothe, Die Was als Dichtung, pp. 5–13. Fantastic views lately promulgated in England are1 dealt with conclusively to my mind by Mr. A. Lang, The World of Homer, pp. 281 sqq., to whose account nothing for controversial purposes need be added. On looking back over the literature I find myself most in agreement with Hans Flach, whose treatise, Die litterarische Thdtigkeit des Peisistratos, 1885, has been unduly depreciated. I shall have to repeat my own views expressed in the Classical Review, 1901, p. 7; 1907, p. 18; and in the Classical Quarterly, 1909, p. 84. (shrink)

In spite of its title, this volume sheds no new light on the debated problem of whether Peirce's ideas form, or can be reconstructed to form, an integrated and internally consistent system. The book, instead, avoids the problem entirely, the pith of its thesis about the unity of Peirce's philosophy being that, in various guises, the notion of Thirdness permeates his thought. Apparently, Haas thinks it evident that to point up the central role of this notion in each of Peirce's (...) subdivisions of philosophy—Phenomenology, Logic, and Metaphysics—is to show the unity of the philosophy as a whole. But he does not counter any specific charges brought against this claim of unity—though he mentions some of them—or even outline how the conception of law is to vindicate this claim. What he does do, following Peirce's three-fold division of philosophy, is to conduct a survey built around the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness theme; and this exposition, though uncritical, is not lacking in care and subtlety, so that those looking for an overview of Peirce's thought can profit from the book.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This collection contains 34 essays, 23 of them previously published, written between 1939 and 1960. They are of varying lengths, generality, and polish; and they cover the wide range of Hall's philosophical interests from metaphilosophy and value theory—the subjects of his best known books—to the theory of perception and the inadequacies of the Oxford philosophy of a decade ago. For Hall the study of language was not a way of repudiating or avoiding the traditional translingual issues, but rather a method (...) for attacking them. One might say that like Leibniz, Kant, and the early Wittgenstein, in their different ways, Hall took "the general form of propositions" as a philosopher's key to the basic categories of reality. Because his idiom was unfashionable among metaphysicians and because his doctrines were alien to the so-called "analysts," his work has not been widely influential. But the many insights and suggestions in this book may yet be taken up. These essays illuminate Hall's books, What Is Value?, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, and Philosophical Systems; and they also make up an important work on their own account.—C. T. W. (shrink)

The author restricts herself to a biological and anthropological viewpoint to discover what it was that suggested to the primitive mind the concept of an "unseen overruling Power." She finds the answer in the primitive woman's experience of pregnancy and childbirth, in which some unseen Power was felt to bestow upon her the gift of a child. The book is absorbing, but contains little of distinctly philosophical interest.—T. S. V.

This reply addresses observations of Drs. Larsen, Kruse, and Sweeny, and Scherer in their reviews of our published work on the link between positive psychological assets and outcomes of physical health. Inspired by Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative we argue that the interplay between the emotion spectrum and health is likely a complex and heterogeneous amalgam of known and yet unidentified elements melding at the individual level. When exploring the emotion–health link, researchers are challenged to grapple with complex system models by (...) considering multiple hierarchies of information that span individual-level factors, genetic blueprints, and cultural and environmental context. Research is needed to more fully elucidate the mechanism through which emotion influences health, with careful consideration of differences across race/ethnicity, culture, and context. (shrink)

Although extremely comprehensive in its subject-matter, catholic in its treatment of diverse points of view, and lucid, this book is not simply a survey. Rather, it is, in its own way, original—not because any information or thesis it contains is new, but because it offers a clear, synoptic, and sophisticated look at what has been a relatively ill-defined and fragmented sector of philosophy, that of determining the nature of the "behavioral sciences." Kaplan's way of accomplishing this is to consider the (...) concepts and activities of science "functionally"; and he generally finds that "no one function can suffice" to show us what, e.g., a law of nature is, or what an experiment is, or what a model is, etc. Thus he typically finds other, mutually competing theories both partially true and too narrow. He also has much that is illuminating to say about the Deweyan ideas that the logic of science is fundamentally a "logic-in-use" ; and that scientific concepts are "open" and properly depend on the context of inquiry, rather than on the logician, for their "closure." Consonant with these themes is his stress on the openness of the concept of methodology itself: behavioral scientists, he contends, will gain no salvation merely by finding better procedures. Of greater importance are the values, choices, and invention of the inquirer himself; and Kaplan, accordingly, treats these matters in detail.—C. T. W. (shrink)

In this paper, we endeavour to give a historically accurate presentation of how Leibniz understood his infinitesimals, and how he justified their use. Some authors claim that when Leibniz called them “fictions” in response to the criticisms of the calculus by Rolle and others at the turn of the century, he had in mind a different meaning of “fiction” than in his earlier work, involving a commitment to their existence as non-Archimedean elements of the continuum. Against this, we show that (...) by 1676 Leibniz had already developed an interpretation from which he never wavered, according to which infinitesimals, like infinite wholes, cannot be regarded as existing because their concepts entail contradictions, even though they may be used as if they exist under certain specified conditions—a conception he later characterized as “syncategorematic”. Thus, one cannot infer the existence of infinitesimals from their successful use. By a detailed analysis of Leibniz’s arguments in his De quadratura of 1675–1676, we show that Leibniz had already presented there two strategies for presenting infinitesimalist methods, one in which one uses finite quantities that can be made as small as necessary in order for the error to be smaller than can be assigned, and thus zero; and another “direct” method in which the infinite and infinitely small are introduced by a fiction analogous to imaginary roots in algebra, and to points at infinity in projective geometry. We then show how in his mature papers the latter strategy, now articulated as based on the Law of Continuity, is presented to critics of the calculus as being equally constitutive for the foundations of algebra and geometry and also as being provably rigorous according to the accepted standards in keeping with the Archimedean axiom. (shrink)

Five essays, each on a different contemporary philosopher. Those on Franco Lombardi, Sartre, and Leszek Kolakowski and other present-day revisionist Marxists were presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium in 1961; the studies of Xavier Zubiri and Heidegger were added specially for this volume. In each case the authors endeavor to say something fresh and substantial; yet each piece is written in a clear and non-technical style. The anthology is therefore to be recommended to those new to the various "continental" (...) ways of doing philosophy, as well as to initiates.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This paper consists in a study of Leibniz’s argument for the infinite plurality of substances, versions of which recur throughout his mature corpus. It goes roughly as follows: since every body is actually divided into further bodies, it is therefore not a unity but an infinite aggregate; the reality of an aggregate, however, reduces to the reality of the unities it presupposes; the reality of body, therefore, entails an actual infinity of constituent unities everywhere in it. I argue that this (...) depends on a generalized notion of aggregation, according to which a thing may be an aggregate of its constituents if every one of its actual parts presupposes such constituents, but is not composed from them. One of the premises of this argument is the reality of bodies. If this premise is denied, Leibniz’s argument for the infinitude of substances, and even of their plurality, cannot go through. (shrink)

A paperback anthology in the Macmillan "Sources in Philosophy" series, this small volume should serve nicely to give beginning students such selected matter for their thought that, if diligent, they might after working through it tackle almost anything written on the subject. What's more, it promises to do this for a topic for which a spate of comparable texts do not already exist, namely, the metaphysics of the "Anglo-american" philosophical tradition. There are five essays on basic metaphysical "schools"—materialism, idealism, absolutism, (...) etc; six on basic metaphysical concepts—substance, universals, identity; and three on metaphysical meaning, judgments, and arguments. All but four of the essays were written after 1910. Baylis contributes a fine introduction.—C. T. W. (shrink)

There is little danger of praising this book too highly: not because it is the last word on the subject but hopefully because it is, in a very real sense, the first. For as convincingly as seems possible in a work of this scope, and in the face of a long and monolithic tradition to the contrary, Danto shows Nietzsche to have produced a profound philosophical system which is highly pertinent to current work in philosophy and in many respects in (...) clear anticipation of it. The exposition of this system so consistently and brilliantly illuminates its formerly obscure recesses that one can scarcely question whether Danto is on the right track. He argues cogently that Nietzsche's theory of truth is fictionalistic, perspectivistic, and pragmatic ; and upon this interpretation of the theory Danto constructs analytical accounts of Nietzsche's doctrines on psychology, morality, values, and religion, and on the widely misunderstood principle of the Will-to-Power. In the light of the volumes of commentary written on these topics, and in their own right, these accounts are superlatively clear and penetrating. Of whatever persuasion or purpose, future work on Nietzsche must take account of this book.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This essay is an appreciation of Massimo Mugnai’s many contributions to Leibniz scholarship, as well as to the history of logic and history of philosophy more generally.

Mayo argues that ethical principles are not actually universal but can be universalized in three senses; they are, in fact, essentially controversial and can best be understood in terms of an analysis of the notion of authority. He conculdes with a critique of duty, as opposed to virtue, as a key to morality.--J. T. W.